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CAPITAL PUNISHMENT IN OHIO: THE
CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE DEATH
PENALTY STATUTE
I.

INTRODUCTION

In 1972, the United States Supreme Court in Furman v.
Georgia' responded to attacks on the death penalty as cruel and
unusual punishment, and ruled that the Georgia death penalty statute was unconstitutional as it was being applied.2 Consequently, the
Supreme Court of Ohio, in State v. Leigh,3 ruled that the infliction
of any death penalty under the then existing Ohio capital sentencing statute was unconstitutional.
After much criticism of the Furman decision,4 Congress and the
majority of states responded by passing new death penalty statutes.
Ohio's version is found at Ohio Revised Code section 2929.021 which
prescribes the death penalty or life imprisonment for the crime of
aggravated murder.'
New cases testing post-Furman statutes caused the United
States Supreme Court to take a definitive stand on the constitutionality of capital punishment. 7 In July of 1976 the Court handed down
1. 408 U.S. 238 (1972). In 1963, in a memorandum opinion to his fellow jurist, Supreme
Court Justice Goldberg questioned the constitutionality of capital punishment. He indicated
that the death penalty amounts to "unnecessary cruelty" in cases where less severe sentences
could be imposed. This memorandum instigated attacks on the death penalty as "cruel and
unusual punishment." Haley, The Death Penalty, Ohio Op. 3d, vol. 2, no. 10, iii (Dec. 20,
1976).
2. The probability of a white man receiving a death sentence in a murder case was three
in ten; for a black man it was nearly five out of ten. Thus, argued the NAACP, capital verdicts
were too often the product of racial discrimination, and it was therefore "cruel and unusual"
to inflict the death penalties in such a haphazard way. See M. MELTSNER, CRUEL AND
UNUSUAL, 73-105 (1973).
3. 31 Ohio St. 2d 97, 285 N.E.2d 333 (1972).
4. The states objected to the decision because it left many questions unanswered,
specifically the question of the inherent constitutionality of the death penalty. Four Justices
would have held that capital punishment was not unconstitutional per se, two Justices would
have reached the opposite conclusion, and three Justices agreed that the statutes before the
Court were invalid as applied, but refused to address the question whether such punishment
could ever be imposed. In drafting new capital punishment statutes, the states were unsure
how to proceed. See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 169 (1976).
5. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2929.02 (Page 1975) (Penalties for murder).
(A) Whoever is convicted of aggravated murder in violation of section 2903.01 of
the Revised Code shall suffer death or be imprisoned for life, as determined pursuant
to sections 2929.03 and 2929.04 of the Revised Code. In addition, the offender may be
fined an amount fixed by the court, but not more than twenty-five thousand dollars.
6. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2929 (Page 1975) (Committee Comment).
Aggravated murder includes premeditated murder and felony murder.
7. See R. Haley, The Death Penalty, Ohio Op. 3d, vol. 2, no. 10, iii, iv (Dec. 20, 1976).
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five decisions in which the respective state death penalty statutes
had been challenged as inherently "cruel and unusual punishment."' 8 In Gregg v. Georgia,9 the Supreme Court, for the first time,
addressed the issue whether the death penalty is constitutionally
prohibited in all cases. In a seven-to-two decision, the Court stated
that "the death penalty is not a form of punishment that may never
be imposed. . . ."10 In the Gregg decision, and the four other accompanying decisions, Proffitt v. Florida," Jurek v. Texas, 2
4 the Court
Woodson v. North Carolina,13 and Roberts v. Louisiana,"
also elucidated what elements of these particular state death statutes made them constitutional or unconstitutional.
The purpose of this comment is to analyze the Ohio statutory
scheme in light of the constitutional standards established by these
post-Furman decisions.
IT.

UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT DECISIONS

In Furman,5 the Court held that the death penalty as it was
being applied was unconstitutional. In a per curiam opinion the
Court held that the "imposition and carrying out of the death penalty in these cases constitute[d] cruel and unusual punishment in
violation of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments."'' The majority objected most stringently to the unbridled discretion of the
judges and juries to impose the death penalty in a totally arbitrary
manner. The absence of any guidelines had led to emotional and
highly discriminatory sentencing which the Court held to be a violation of the eighth amendment's prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment. Although a consensus was not reached," the concerns of the five Justice majority were summarized in Justice
White's concurring opinion which stated that the "death penalty as
imposed was unconstitutional since there is no meaningful basis for
8. The Court upheld the imposition of the death penalty under statutes in Georgia,
Florida, and Texas, while striking down the death penalty statutes of Louisiana and North
Carolina.
9. 428 U.S. 153 (1976).
10. Id. at 187.
11. 428 U.S. 242 (1976).
12. 428 U.S. 262 (1976).
13. 428 U.S. 280 (1976).
14. 428 U.S. 325 (1976).
15. 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
16. Id. at 239-40.
17. The five majority opinions were returned by Justices Douglas, Brennan, Stewart,
White, and Marshall, with Chief Justice Burger, Justices Blackmun, Powell, and Rehnquist
dissenting.
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distinguishing the few cases in which it is imposed from the many
cases in which it is not."'"
The Court avoided the question whether capital punishment
per se violated the eighth amendment in that three members of the
majority dealt only with the discretionary aspects of the challenged
statutes. Only Justices Brennan and Marshall came to the conclusion that the death penalty per se violates the eighth amendment.' 9
In an effort to respond to the concerns expressed in Furman,
Georgia drafted a new capital punishment statute 0 designed to base
the determination of the death sentence upon objective rather than
subjective guidelines. The adopted statutory provision provides that
the sentence be determined by the jury after all relevant evidence
is presented at a pre-sentence hearing. In order to impose the death
penalty, one of ten statutory aggravating circumstances must be
proven. 2 ' Even when a statutory aggravating circumstance is
18. 408 U.S. at 313.
19. Id. at 375. Conversely, the minority opinion, expressed by Chief Justice Burger and
joined by Justices Blackmun, Powell, and Rehnquist, held "the constitutional prohibition
against 'cruel and unusual punishments' could not be construed to bar the imposition of the
punishment of death."
20. GA. CODE ANN. §§ 26-1101, 26-1311, 26-1902, 26-2201, 26-3301 (1972).
21. GA. CODE ANN. § 27-2534.1 (b) (Supp. 1977). The ten statutory aggravating circumstances in this section include:
(1) The offense of murder, rape, armed robbery, or kidnapping was committed by
a person with a prior record of conviction for a capital felony, or the offense of murder
was committed by a person who has a substantial history of serious assaultive criminal
convictions.
(2) The offense of murder, rape, armed robbery, or kidnapping was committed
while the offender was engaged in the commission of another capital felony, or aggravated battery, or the offense of murder was committed while the offender was engaged
in the commission of burglary or arson in the first degree.
(3) The offender by his act of murder, armed robbery, or kidnapping knowingly
created a great risk of death to more than one person in a public place by means of a
weapon or device which would normally be hazardous to the lives of more than one
person.
(4) The offender committed the offense of murder for himself or another, for the
purpose of receiving money or any other thing of monetary value.
(5) The murder of a judicial officer, former judicial officer, district attorney or
solicitor or former district attorney or solicitor during or because of the exercise of his
official duty.
(6) The offender caused or directed another to commit murder or committed
murder as an agent or employee of another person.
(7) The offense of murder, rape, armed robbery, or kidnapping was outrageously
or wantonly vile, horrible or inhuman in that it involved torture, depravity of mind,
or an aggravated battery to the victim.
(8) The offense of murder was committed against any peace officer, corrections
employee or fireman while engaged in the performance of his official duties.
(9) The offense of murder was committed by a person in, or who has escaped from,
the lawful custody of a peace officer or place of lawful confinement.
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proven, however, the imposition of the death penalty may be pre22
cluded by the jury's finding of any mitigating circumstance.
Four years following Furman, and subsequent to the adoption
of Georgia's new death penalty statute, the Court again addressed
the constitutionality of capital punishment in five decisions rendered the same day. The major rationale of those opinions was set
23
forth in Gregg v. Georgia.
Gregg, a twenty-one year old itinerant who was hitch-hiking
through Georgia, shot and killed the two men who had given him a
ride. In accordance with Georgia's new death penalty statute, Gregg
was convicted of murder and was sentenced to death. Following
unsuccessful appeals in the state courts, the Supreme Court granted
certiorari.
The Court addressed several significant issues related to the
death penalty and to the Georgia statute as applied. Gregg's contention that the death penalty per se is cruel and unusual punishment
and violates the eighth amendment was refuted by the majority
opinion. The majority held that the penalty of death is not unconstitutional per se as long as it is not rendered in an arbitrary or capricious manner. 2 Further, the Court ruled that the eighth amendment only prohibits as cruel and unusual punishment any penalty
which is not in accord with the dignity of man and which is excessive as to its form or severity.2 5 In considering the excessiveness of
a penalty, the Court stated that two tests must be met: "First, the
punishment must not involve the unnecessary and wanton infliction
of pain," and "second, the punishment must not be grossly out of
(10) The murder was committed for the purpose of avoiding, interfering with, or
preventing a lawful arrest or custody in a place of lawful confinement, of himself or
another.
(c) The statutory instructions as determined by the trial judge to be warranted
by the evidence shall be given in charge and in writing to the jury for its deliberation.
The jury, if its verdict be a recommendation of death, shall designate in writing, signed
by the foreman of the jury, the aggravating circumstance or circumstances which it
found beyond a reasonable doubt. In non-jury cases the judge shall make such designation. Except in cases of treason or aircraft hijacking, unless at least one of the statutory
aggravating circumstances enumerated in section 27-2534.1 (b) is so found, the death
penalty shall not be imposed.
22. See GA. CODE ANN. § 27-2534.1(b) (Supp. 1977), which does not delineate the scope
of mitigating circumstances but allows any mitigating factor to be presented to the jury.
23. 428 U.S. 153 .(1976). The Gregg decision was referred to by the Court in its other
four decisions rendered the same day. The question whether the death penalty per se is
constitutional is addressed only in the Gregg decision.
24. Id. at 188.
25. Id. at 173.
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proportion to the severity of the crime. '2 In the opinion of the
Court, capital punishment is not a disproportionate penalty for the
27
crime of aggravated murder.
In Furman v. Georgia,2 8 the Supreme Court expressed the concern that the death penalty was being applied in an arbitrary and
capricious manner. The Court found that the carefully drafted postFurman statute as applied in Gregg adequately alleviated this problem. The Court held that the statute guarantees that adequate guidance and information is presented to the sentencing authority before
any decision is made, and that the statute's requirement that the
Georgia Supreme Court review 9 all decisions in which a death
penalty is rendered further insures against the "wanton" and
"freakish" 30 imposition of the death penalty. The statute assures
that the sentence is in accordance with the facts as presented at trial
and in the pre-sentence hearing, that it is equivalent to sentences
imposed on defendants in similar cases, and that the sentence was
determined on the basis of objective criteria, rather than the result
of prejudice or passion.3'
In its analysis of the Georgia statute, the Court also stated that
a bifurcated system as adopted by Georgia is preferable.3 2 This system allows an unlimited amount of relevant evidence to be presented at the presentence hearing, including evidence which may
have been inadmissible at trial. The Court indicated that the jury
should have at its disposal as much information as possible before
a sentence is imposed, stating:
We think that the Georgia court wisely has chosen not to impose
unnecessary restrictions on the evidence that can be offered at such
26. Id.
27. Id. at 187.
28. 408 U.S. 238 (1972). In his concurring opinion, Justice Stewart stated that "the
petitioners are among a capriciously selected random handful upon whom the sentence of
death was imposed..." and "that the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments cannot tolerate
the infliction of a sentence of death under legal systems that permit this unique penalty to
be so wantonly and so freakishly imposed." Id. at 309-10.
29. GA. CODE ANN. § 27-2537 (Supp. 1977).
30. 428 U.S. at 206-07.
31. GA. CODE ANN. § 27-2537 (Supp. 1977). Upon review of a death penalty imposition,
the Georgia Supreme Court is required to make three determinations:
(1) whether the sentence of death was imposed under the influence of passion,
prejudice or any other arbitrary factor,
(2) whether. . . the evidence supports the jury's or judge's finding of a statutory
aggravating circumstance ....
(3) whether the sentence of death is excessive or disproportionate to the penalty
imposed in similar cases, considering both the crime and the defendant.
32. 428 U.S. at 195.
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a hearing and to approve open and far ranging argument.... So long
as the evidence introduced and the arguments made at the presentence hearing do not prejudice a defendant, it is preferable not to
impose restrictions. We think it desirable for the jury to have as much
information before it as possible when it makes the sentencing deci33
sion .

In Proffitt v. Florida,31 decided the same day as Gregg, the
Court was asked to rule on the constitutionality of the Florida
statute. Following the Furman decision, in an effort to construct
a statute which would satisfy the concerns expressed therein, the
state of Florida also drafted a new statute which delineated the
manner in which a death penalty can be imposed for first degree
murder. Proffitt challenged the provisions of the statute.3 5 Although
the Florida statute differs from the Georgia statute in its procedural
aspects, 31 the Court affirmed the decision of the lower courts.
In doing so the Court relied on the opinions expressed in Gregg,
and reiterated that the appellate review system, equivalent to that
established by the Georgia statute, minimizes the risk of arbitrary
or capricious sentencing, and makes certain that death sentences
3
are being consistently applied in similar circumstancesY.
The Florida statute sets forth eight aggravating circumstances
and seven mitigating circumstances" which must be weighed prior
33. Id. at 203-04.
34. Id. at 242.
35. Id. at 246-47. Proffitt was found guilty of the murder of a man during the commission of a burglary. At the presentence hearing, the statutory aggravating circumstances were
found to outweigh the statutory mitigating circumstances and the jury recommended the
imposition of the death penalty. The judge sentenced the defendant to death after finding
the existence of four statutory aggravating circumstances and none of the statutory mitigating
circumstances.
36. Id. at 248. Like the Georgia statute, Florida also has statutorily delineated aggravating circumstances; while Georgia does not enumerate mitigating circumstances in its statute,
Florida does. In Florida, the determination of sentence hinges upon whether the aggravating
circumstances found to exist outweigh the existing mitigating circumstances. Although the
statutory aggravating and mitigating circumstances must be considered, any evidence
deemed relevant by the judge may be weighed. If the aggravating circumstances outweigh
the mitigating circumstances, the death penalty is imposed. The jury's decision in the matter
of sentence determination is only advisory.
37. Id. at 250. The appellate review system differs from the Georgia system only in that
the Florida statute does not specify exactly what form the review should take.
38. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 921.141 (5)-(6) (West Supp. 1976-77). The eight aggravating
circumstances as well as mitigating circumstances are specified in the statute as follows:
(5) Aggravating circumstances. - Aggravating circumstances shall be limited to
the following:
(a) The capital felony was committed by a person under sentence of imprisonment.
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to determining sentence. At a pre-sentence hearing, any evidence
which the judge deems relevant to sentencing may be presented.
The evidence must include, but is not limited to, all available evidence pertaining to the eight aggravating and seven mitigating circumstances. 9 The jury's verdict is determined by majority vote but
is, however, only advisory. The judge has the ultimate responsibility
for determining sentence.
Proffitt alleged that the aggravating and mitigating circumstances set forth in the Florida statute are vague and overbroad,
that no guidance is given as to how they should be weighed, and
thus the new procedures do not in reality prevent the arbitrary or
capricious infliction of the death penalty which was condemned in
Furman. He further asserted that neither a judge nor a jury is objectively capable of weighing the importance of the aggravating and
mitigating circumstances, and that it is not possible to consistently
make a rational determination of which outweighs the other.4 '
(b) The defendant was previously convicted of another capital felony or of a felony
involving the use or threat of violence to the person.
(c) The defendant knowingly created a great risk of death to many persons.
(d) The capital felony was committed while the defendant was engaged, or was
an accomplice, in the commission of, or an attempt to commit, or flight after committing or attempting to commit, any robbery, rape, arson, burglary, kidnapping, or
aircraft piracy or the unlawful throwing, placing, or discharging of a destructice device
or bomb.
(e) The capital felony was committed for the purpose of avoiding or preventing a
lawful arrest or effecting an escape from custody.
(f) The capital felony was committed for pecuniary gain.
(g) The capital felony was committed to disrupt or hinder the lawful exercise of
any governmental function or the enforcement of laws.
(h) The capital felony was especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel.
(6) Mitigating circumstances. - Mitigating circumstances shall be the following:
(a) The defendant has no significant history of prior criminal activity.
(b) The capital felony was committed while the defendant was under the influence
of extreme mental or emotional disturbance.
(c) The victim was a participant in the defendant's conduct or consented to the
act.
(d) The defendant was an accomplice in the capital felony committed by another
person and his participation was relatively minor.
(e) The defendant acted under extreme duress or under the substantial domination of another person.
(f) The capacity of the defendant to appreciate the criminality of his conduct or
to conform his conduct to the requirements of law was substantially impaired.
(g) The age of the defendant at the time of the crime.
39. 428 U.S. at 248.
40. Id. at 249. "The Florida Supreme Court has stated however, that '[in order to
sustain a sentence of death following a jury recommendation of life, the facts suggesting a
sentence of death should be so clear and convincing that virtually no reasonable person could
differ.' Tedder v. State, 322 So. 2d 908, 910 (1975)."
41. Id. at 257.
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In responding to these assertions, the Court stated that the
weighing of evidence is traditionally required of juries, and many of
the same considerations are involved in other judicial decisions.2
The Court stated:
[T]he requirements of Furman are satisfied when the sentencing
authority's decision is guided and channeled by requiring examination of specific factors that argue in favor of or against imposition of

the death penalty, thus eliminating
total arbitrariness and capri3
ciousness in its imposition.

Following Furman, Texas also revised its capital punishment
statute. The Texas legislature strictly limited the category and
number of offenses for which capital punishment can be imposed"
and adopted a new capital sentencing procedure." Once a defendant
is convicted of a capital offense, the new Texas statute provides for
a separate pre-sentence hearing before the same jury that decided
the issue of guilt." This bifurcated proceeding is similar to those of
Florida and Georgia which were applauded by the Court. Unlike the
previous two statutes discussed, however, the Texas statute does not
enumerate specific aggravating and mitigating circumstances to be
considered.
The constitutionality of these provisions was addressed in
Jurek v. Texas.4 7 Jurek was sentenced to death for the kidnapping,
rape, and murder of a ten year old girl. He asserted that the changes
in the Texas Penal Code had not diminished the propensity for the
death penalty to be applied in an arbitrary and capricious manner.
He specifically contended that the question" upon which the impo42. Id. The determination of the validity of a defense contention of insanity or reduced
capacity necessitates the evaluation of the same information weighed in mitigating circumstances. This decision has traditionally been one for juries to make.
43. Id. at 258.
44. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 19.03(a)(Vernon 1974). Texas strictly limited capital offenses in the post-Furman statute. The death penalty may only be imposed for five specific
instances of intentional and knowing murders: 1) murder of a peace officer or fireman, 2)
murder intentionally committed during the course of the commission of a kidnapping, burglary, robbery, aggravated rape, or arson, 3) murder committed for pecuniary gain, 4) murder
committed while escaping from a penal institution, 5) murder of a prison employee while a
prisoner is in the institution.
45. TEX. CRIM. PROC. CODE ANN. art. 37.071 (Vernon Supp. 1976-77).
46. 428 U.S. at 267. At this presentence hearing, any relevant evidence may be presented, and both the defense and prosecution may argue why the penalty should be imposed,
or why it should not be.
47. Id. at 271-74.
48. Id. at 274. The petitioner asserted that it is impossible to reliably predict future
behavior, therefore the question is so vague that it cannot prevent arbitrariness and capriciousness from entering into sentencing decisions. The Court responded that prediction of
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sition of the death penalty relies was so vague as to provide the jury
with untrammeled discretion in arriving at its sentencing decision.
Although the statute does not specify aggravating and mitigating circumstances the Court found that by narrowing the number
of capital offenses to five very specific circumstances of knowing and
intentional murder, 9 the Texas legislature had essentially set forth
aggravating circumstances equivalent to those of the Florida and
Georgia statutes. This satisfied the Court's concern that the sentencing authority be given objective guidance in focusing its consideration on the particular nature of the individual offense.
The question of the lack of specified mitigating circumstances
to guide the jury was crucial to the Court's decision. The Texas
statute provides that after a finding of guilt of a capital offense has
been reached, the jury must answer three questions at the presentence hearing 0 If one of these questions is answered affirmatively, the death sentence is imposed. The Court stated that the
issue "of whether the enumerated questions allow consideration of
particularized mitigating factors" 5' would determine whether the
statute is constitutional.
One of the statutory questions asks the jury to determine
"whether there is a probability that the defendant would commit
criminal acts of violence that would constitute a continuing threat
to society."52 The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals, in the present
case, indicated that it would interpret this question as allowing the
defendant to introduce at the presentence hearing any mitigating
future criminal conduct is inherently a part of our criminal justice system and pointed out
several decisions which must be based upon this prediction, viz. setting of bail, punishment
determination, parole hearings. See note 50 infra for the three questions that the jury must
answer.
49. TEx. PENAL CODE ANN. § 19.03(a) (Vernon Supp. 1976-77). For the text see note 44
supra.
50. Tax. CalM. PRO. ANN. CODE art. 37.071(b)(Vernon Supp. 1976-77). The questions
the jury must answer are:
1) whether the conduct of the defendant that caused the death of the deceased was
committed deliberately and with the reasonable expectation that the death of the
deceased or another would result.
2) . whether there is a probability that the defendant would commit criminal acts of
violence that would constitute a continuing threat to society.
3) if raised by the evidence, whether the conduct of the defendant in killing the
deceased was unreasonable in response to the provocation, if any, by the deceased.
A "yes" answer requires a unanimous decision of the jury. A "no" answer only requires the
agreement of 10 of 12 jurors. See TEx. CRIM. PRO. CODE ANN. art. 37.071(d)(Vernon Supp.
1976-77).
51. 428 U.S. at 272.
52. TEx. CRIM. PRO. CODE ANN. art. 37.071(b)(2)(Vernon Supp. 1976-77). For the text
of art. 37.071(b)(2) see note 50 supra.

Published by eCommons, 1978

UNIVERSITY OF DAYTON

LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 3:1

circumstances he may be able to show.53 In light of this ruling by
the Texas court, the constitutionality of the Texas statute was upheld. In its opinion, the United States Supreme Court again
stressed, as in the previous two cases, that:
A jury must be allowed to consider on the basis of all relevant evidence not only why a death [penalty] should be imposed but also
why it should not be imposed.
Thus, in order to meet the requirements of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments, a capital-sentencing system must allow the
sentencing authority to consider mitigating circumstances.54

The specification found in the Georgia and Florida laws requiring mandatory review by the state supreme courts of all cases in
which the death penalty is rendered, is absent in the Texas law,
although the Texas statute does provide for expedited review by the
Texas Court of Criminal Appeals.55 The Court stated that a system
which allows automatic review by a court having statewide jurisdiction is sufficient to ensure the even application of the death penalty
even though it is not mandatory. 5
The same day that the constitutionality of the Georgia, Florida,
and Texas statutes were upheld, the post-Furman death penalty
statutes of North Carolina and Louisiana were held unconstitu58
57
tional in Woodson v. North Carolina and Roberts v. Louisiana,
respectively. Both states, wishing to retain capital punishment,
enacted statutes prescribing mandatory death sentences for first
degree murder.5 By imposing mandatory death sentences, North
Carolina and Louisiana removed discretionary sentencing from the
53. 428 U.S. at 272-73. The court stated that in deciding whether a defendant might
be a continued threat to society, the jury could consider significant prior criminal record,
range and severity of past criminal behavior, the age of the defendant at the time of offense
was committed, the presence or absence of duress or domination of another person as a cause
of the offense, and whether the offense was committed while the defendant was under extreme
mental or emotional pressure, less than insanity.
54. Id. at 271.
55. TEX. CRIM. PRO. CODE ANN. art. 37.071(f)(Vernon Supp. 1976-77).
56. 428 U.S. at 276. It is interesting to note that at the time Jurek v. Texas was heard
by the United States Supreme Court, the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals had affirmed only
one judgement other than Jurek in which a death penalty had been imposed under its postFurman law. See Smith v. State, 532 S.W.2d 351 (Tex. Ct. Crim. App. 1976).
57. 428 U.S. 280 (1976).
58. 428 U.S. 325 (1976).
Supp. 1975)(A guilty verdict returned for first degree
59. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-17 (Cum.
murder requires mandatory imposition of the death penalty). LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 14:30
(West 1974) ("Whoever commits the crime of first degree murder shall be punished by
death.")
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hands of the jury. The statutes differ only in that Louisiana adopted
a restricted definition of first degree murder.'" The United States
Supreme Court held that the difference is not constitutionally significant.
In finding these statutes unconstitutional, the Court held that
mandatory sentencing does not satisfy the requirements set forth in
Furmanbecause it would not remove from the jury unbridled discretion in sentencing.' The Court cited the historical inclination of
juries, under similar statutes previously in existence, to frequently
refuse to convict or to convict defendants of lesser charges because
they felt that the death penalty was too severe in a particular instance."2 Essentially, the death penalty was being capriciously and
arbitrarily applied, a practice which was held unconstitutional in
Furman.
The statutes were also found deficient because no provision was
made for any meaningful appellate review to check the arbitrary
exercise of the jury's power. 3
Yet another constitutional shortcoming apparent in both statutes was the failure to focus attention on the particular circumstances of each offense and the failure to consider all significant aspects
of the character and past history of the defendant. 4 The Court has
frequently expressed its opposition to all persons convicted of like
offenses as being treated "not as uniquely individual human beings,
but as members of a faceless, undifferentiated mass to be subjected
to the blind infliction of the penalty of death.""
III.

CONSTITUTIONAL TEST

A paramount issue in all post-Furman cases was whether the
death penalty under any circumstances is cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the eighth and fourteenth amendments. The
60. LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 14:30 (West 1974). Murder in the first degree was statutorily
defined as the killing of a human being during commission of aggravated kidnapping, aggravated rape or armed robbery with specific intent to inflict great bodily harm; with specific
intent to inflict great bodily harm upon a peace officer or fireman; where the offender has
previously been convicted of an unrelated murder or is serving a life sentence; with intent to
do great bodily harm to more than one person; and when the intended murder was committed
for money or remuneration.
61. 428 U.S. at 302.
62. Id. at 293. The gradual evolution of discretionary jury sentencing was the direct
result of continued evidence of jury reluctance to return guilty verdicts for offenses requiring
mandatory death penalties.
63. 428 U.S. at 303.
64. 428 U.S. at 333.
65. 428 U.S. at 304.
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Court held in Gregg and reiterated in the subsequent cases that the
death penalty per se in capital cases is not disproportionate to the
severity of the crime and can not be construed as constitutionally
unacceptable for reasons of being an excessive punishment.
The Court has indicated specific conditions upon which the
death penalty may be imposed. In Gregg, the Court stated that the
requirements set forth in Furman that the death penalty not be
imposed in an arbitrary and capricious manner, could be satisfied
by "a carefully drafted statute that ensures that the sentencing
authority is given adequate information and guidance.""6 This requirement can be met by providing the sentencing authority with
the opportunity to focus on the particular circumstances of the specific offense, and to give special consideration to the unique character of the individual defendant before sentencing.
The Georgia, Florida, and Texas statutes all provide, legislatively or by judicial interpretation, for the consideration of aggravating and mitigating circumstances prior to sentence determination. The North Carolina and Louisiana statutes only provided for
the consideration of aggravating circumstances; and the Supreme
Court in Woodson ruled that the failure to consider mitigating circumstances is tantamount to ignoring the consideration of the
unique character and the circumstances of the particular offender.67
The Court indicated in its decision in Gregg that a bifurcated
system of guilt determination and sentencing could best meet the
concerns addressed above.8 It stated that when a pre-sentence hearing is held, it is more likely that all relevant information will be
presented - even that which may have been detrimental to the
case, or inadmissible as evidence at trial. Although Georgia, Florida, and Texas all have adopted a bifurcated procedure, nowhere
has the Court ruled that this would be the only manner in which
the constitutional requirements could be met. However, one of the
bases for declaring the North Carolina and Louisiana statutes unconstitutional was that these states had adopted mandatory death
penalty statutes which required no pre-sentence hearing.
66. 428 U.S. at 195.
67. 428 U.S. at 304. "A process that accords no significance to relevant facets of the
character and record of the individual offender ...excludes from consideration in fixing
the
ultimate penalty of death the possibility of compassionate or mitigating factors stemming
from the diverse frailties of humankind."
68. 428 U.S. at 195. "As a general proposition these concerns are best met by a bifurcated proceeding at which the sentencing authority is apprised of the information relevant
to the imposition of sentence and provided with standards to guide its use of the information."
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Another concern manifest in all five opinions is that of state
judicial review of the death penalty cases. The Court stated in Gregg
that review by an appellate court, whether obligatory or by right,
ensures that capital sentences are imposed on the basis of objective
criteria rather than arbitrarily or under the influence of prejudice
or passion, and that the same sentences are being imposed under
9
similar circumstances in the different judicial districts. Florida,
Georgia, and Texas all met this test while North Carolina and
Louisiana did not.
Summarizing the five decisions and the significant points expressed therein, the three cases upheld have several elements in
common. These elements were reiterated in all three cases and were
pointed out as being lacking in the two cases which were overturned. They are, therefore, highly significant in determining the
constitutionality of Ohio's capital punishment statute. Using these
key elements, a test can be developed to analyze the constitutionality of any capital punishment statute. The key provisions which
must be present are: 1) sufficient objective statutory guidelines to
satisfy the concerns in Furman that the death penalty not be applied in an arbitrary or capricious manner; 2) consideration of all
the particular circumstances of the specific offense before the sentence is determined; ° 3) statutory provision for expedited judicial
review of all cases involving the imposition of the death penalty.
The judicial review may be either mandatory, as in Georgia or Florida, or upon appeal by right as in Texas; and, 4) consideration of
the past record and unique character of the individual offender
before the sentence is determined.7
69. An interesting evaluation of the effects of the appellate review systems in Florida
and Texas, is given by Justice Rehnquist in his dissenting opinion in North Carolina v.
Woodson, 428 U.S. 280, 318-19 (1976):
Identical defects seem inherent in the systems of appellate review provided in Texas
and Florida, for neither requires the sentencing authority which concludes that a death
penalty is inappropriate to state what mitigating factors were found to be present or
whether certain aggravating factors urged by the prosecutor were actually lacking
. Appellate review affords no correction whatever with respect to those furtunate
...
few who are the beneficiaries of random discretion exercised by juries, whether under
an admittedly discretionary system or under a purportedly mandatory system. It may
make corrections at one end of the spectrum, but cannot at the other.
70. The three statutes upheld by the United States Supreme Court all fulfilled this
requirement by legislatively specifying aggravating circumstances, then allowing the introduction of any evidence related to the nature of the offense at the presentence hearing.
71. The three statutes upheld by the United States Supreme Court all fulfilled this
requirement by allowing, statutorily or through judicial interpretation, the introduction of all
relevant information about the nature of the offense and the character and record of the
offender to be considered in mitigation.
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IV. OHIO AND THE DEATH PENALTY
The Ohio Supreme Court responded to Furman in State v.
Leigh.72 Leigh was a convicted murderer who had been sentenced to
death under the Ohio capital punishment statute then in existence. 73 In its decision, the court stated that "under . . . .
[Furman], which we are required to follow, the infliction of any
death penalty under the existing law of Ohio is now unconstitutional
''74

Prior to the Furman and Leigh decisions, the Ohio legislature
was in the process of drafting the present Ohio capital punishment
statute. The statute, delineated in Ohio Revised Code sections
2929.03 and 2929.04, 75 prescribes the procedure for the imposition of
72.
73.
74.
75.

31 Ohio St. 2d 97, 285 N.E.2d 333 (1972).
O~M REV. CODE ANN. § 2901.01 (Page 1954) (repealed 1974).
31 Ohio St. 2d at 99, 285 N.E.2d at 334.
OHIo REV. CODE ANN. §§ 2929.03-04 (Page 1975).
§ 2929.03 (A) If the indictment or count in the indictment charging aggravated
murder contains no specification of an aggravating circumstance listed in division (A)
of section 2929.04 of the Revised Code, then, following a verdict of guilty of the charge,
the trial court shall impose sentence of life imprisonment on the offender.
(B) If the indictment or count in the indictment charging aggravated murder
contains one or more specifications of aggravating circumstances listed in division (A)
of section 2929.04 of the Revised Code, the verdict shall separately state whether the
accused is found guilty or not guilty of the principal charge and, if guilty of the
principal charge, whether the offender is guilty or not guilty of each specification. The
jury shall be instructed on its duties in this regard, which shall include an instruction
that a specification must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt in order to support a
guilty verdict on such specification, but such instruction shall not mention the penalty
which may be the consequence of a guilty or not guilty verdict on any charge or
specification.
(C) If the indictment or count in the indictment charging aggravated murder
contains one or more specifications of aggravating circumstances listed in division (A)
of section 2929.04 of the Revised Code, then following a verdict of guilty of the charge
but not guilty of the specifications, the trial court shall impose sentence of life imprisonment on the offender. If the indictment contains one or more specifications listed in
division (A) of such section, then following a verdict of guilty of both the charge and
one or more of the specifications, the penalty to be imposed on the offender shall be
determined:
(1) By the panel of three judges which tried the offender upon his waiver of the
right to trial by jury;
(2) By the trial judge, if the offender was tried by jury.
(D) When death may be imposed as a penalty for aggravated murder, the court
shall require a pre-sentence investigation and a psychiatric examination to be made,
and reports submitted to the court pursuant to section 2947.06 of the Revised Code.
Copies of the reports shall be furnished to the prosecutor and to the offender or his
counsel. The court shall hear testimony and other evidence, the statement, if any, of
the offender, and the arguments, if any, of counsel for the defense and prosecution
relevant to the penalty which should be imposed on the offender. If the offender
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the death penalty. It purports to remove from the judge and jury as
much descretion as possible in sentence determination proceedings
chooses to make a statement, he is subject to cross examination only if he consents to
make such statement under oath or affirmation.
(E) Upon consideration of the reports, testimony, other evidence, statement of the
offender, and arguments of counsel submitted to the court pursuant to division (D)
of this section, if the court finds, or if the panel of three judges unanimously finds that
none of the mitigating circumstances listed in division (B) of section 2929.04 of the
Revised Code is established by a preponderance of the evidence, it shall impose sentence of death on the offender. Otherwise it shall impose sentence of life imprisonment
on the offender.
§ 2929.04 (A) Imposition of the death penalty for aggravated murder is precluded, unless one or more of the following is specified in the indictment or count in
the indictment pursuant to section 2941.14 of the Revised Code, and is proved beyond
a reasonable doubt:
(1) The offense was the assassination of the President of the United States or
person in line of succession to the presidency, or of the governor or lieutenant
governor of this state, or of the president-elect or vice president-elect of the
United States, or of the governor-elect or lieutenant governor-elect of this state,
or of a candidate for any of the foregoing offices. For purposes of this division, a
person is a candidate if he has been nominated for election according to law, or
if he has filed a petition or petitions according to law to have his name placed
on the ballot in a primary or general election, or if he campaigns as a write-in
candidate in a primary or general election.
(2) The offense was committed for hire.
(3) The offense was committed for the purpose of escaping detection, apprehension, trial, or punishment for another offense committed by the offender.
(4) The offense was committed while the offender was a prisoner in a detention
facility as defined in section 2929.01 of the Revised Code.
(5) The offender has previously been convicted of an offense of which the gist
was the purposeful killing of or attempt to kill another, committed prior to the
offense at bar, or the offense at bar was part of a course of conduct involving
the purposeful killing of or attempt to kill two or more persons by the offender.
(6) The victim of the offense was a law enforcement officer whom the offender
knew to be such, and either the victim was engaged in his duties at the time of
the offense, or it was the offender's specific purpose to kill a law enforcement
officer.
(7) The offense was committed while the offender was committing, attempting
to commit, or fleeing immediately after committing or attempting to commit
kidnapping, rape, aggravated arson, aggravated robbery, or aggravated burglary.
(B) Regardless of whether one or more of the aggravating circumstances listed in
division (A) of this section is specified in the indictment and proved beyond a reasonable doubt, the death penalty for aggravated murder is precluded when, considering
the nature and circumstances of the offense and the history, character, and condition
of the offender, one or more of the following is established by a preponderance of the
evidence:
(1) The victim of the offense induced or facilitated it.
(2) It is unlikely that the offense would have been committed, but for the fact
that the offender was under duress, coercion, or strong provocation.
(3) The offense was primarily the product of the offender's psychosis or mental
deficiency, though such condition is insufficient to establish the defense of insanity.
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while retaining the death penalty. This approach is intended to
satisfy the Furman concern of indiscriminate, inconsistent, and prejudicial sentencing.
Ohio's statutory scheme adopted the bifurcated system endorsed by the Model Penal Code.7" This system requires the separation of guilt determination from sentence determination. The adoption of this system was based on several considerations addressed
by the Technical Committee appointed by the Ohio Legislature
Service Commission:7

The present system [pre 1974 law] for imposing the death penalty
presents substantial difficulties, growing out of the fact that the question of guilt and the question of penalty are considered by the jury
at the same time. First, the procedure places the defense in the position of having to plead for the accused's life at the same time he is
trying to convince the jury that he is not guilty in the first instance.
The two arguments are not always compatible, and in a given case a
plea for mercy can subtly incline the jurors toward rendering a verdict

of guilty. ...

Accordingly, the proposed section provides a procedure

whereby the guilt or innocence of the accused is separately determined, and if a guilty verdict is returned, a second hearing is held
solely on the question of the penalty which ought to be imposed. The
technical committee feels that this will permit the jury to consider
the question more dispassionately, and armed with better information....
This system of sentencing was applauded by the United States Supreme Court in Gregg.79
The Ohio Revised Code limits capital punishment solely to the
crime of aggravated murder.8 0 In addition, an indictment charging
aggravated murder must contain one or more specifications of aggravating circumstances." The seven aggravating circumstances
are: 1) assassination of the President, Vice-President, Governor,
Lieutenant Governor; 2) murder that was committed for hire; 3)
murder that was committed while fleeing from another offense; 4)
murder that was committed while a prisoner; 5) killing two or more
76.

MODEL PENAL CODE

§ 210.6.

77. OHno REV. CODE ANN. § 103.12 (Page 1969). The Technical Committee was appointed pursuant to statutory authority to conduct a survey of current problems stemming
from Ohio's criminal laws and procedures. The report submitted by this committee in 1967
recommended a complete revision of Ohio statutory law covering crimes and procedures.
78. Ohio Leg. Ser. Comm., Proposed Ohio Criminal Code 282 (1972).

79.

428 U.S. at 192.

80.
81.

OHIo REv. CODE ANN. § 2903.01 (Page 1975).
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2929.03(B) (Page 1975). See note 75 supra for text.
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persons; 6) killing a law enforcement officer; 7) murder that was
done while committing another crime."
Before the death penalty can be considered, the jury must find
the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of one or more
aggravating circumstances. Following the guilty verdict, the penalty
to be imposed is determined by the trial judge, or three judge panel
if the offender waived his right to trial by jury. Prior to determination of sentence, a psychiatric examination and a pre-sentence hearing are required.13 At the hearing, the psychiatric reports, the
statement of the offender, the arguments of counsel, and other
relevant evidence are presented to the court. If, following the consideration of this information, the court finds that one of three
mitigating circumstances has been established by a preponderance
of the evidence, life imprisonment shall be imposed. The mitigating
circumstances are: 1) the victim induced or facilitated the murder;
2) the offender was under duress, coercion, or strong provocation;
3) the offense was caused by the offender's psychosis or mental
mitigating
deficiency. 4 In the absence of one of the three statutory
8 5
circumstances, the mandatory penalty is death.
The first case which challenged the constitutionality of the new
Ohio statutory scheme was State v. Bayless." Bayless was sentenced to death for the robbery-murder of a husband and wife whom
he had abducted from a parking lot. He was found guilty of two
counts of aggravated murder. At the presentence hearing, Bayless
raised the defense of mental deficiency as a mitigating circumstance. A defense psychologist testified that "the defendant had the
mental ability. . .to know it was unlawful, but did not have the
emotional capacity to conform his conduct to the requirements of
the law because of a lack of any conscience or any feeling of guilt
and remorse attached to a wrong act. 87 The court ruled that even
with this testimony, none of the three mitigating circumstances
was proven by a preponderance of the evidence, and therefore,
imposed the sentence of death. The court of appeals overruled all
assignments of error and the case went before the Ohio Supreme
OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 2929.04(B)
OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 2929.03(D)
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2929.04(B)
85. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2929.03(E)
86. 48 Ohio St. 2d 73, 357 N.E.2d 1035
it is the decision which the court has followed
tionality of the Ohio death penalty statute.
87. Id. at 78, 357 N.E.2d at 1041.
82.
83.
84.
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(1976). Bayless is especially significant because
in all subsequent cases addressing the constitu-
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Court as a matter of right. In addition to other propositions of law,
Bayless proposed that the Ohio statute placed unconstitutional limitations upon the number of mitigating circumstances that could be
considered.
Addressing the constitutionality of the statute, the Ohio Supreme Court relied heavily on the decisions of Gregg v. Georgia"s and
Proffitt v. Florida.9 The court indicated what it regarded as significant similarities between the Ohio statute and the statutes which
were constitutionally upheld by the United States Supreme Court:
"Each of the statutes provide for a bifurcated trial, with a separate
sentencing hearing to consider information relevant to the imposition of sentence, under standards to guide the sentencing authority
in the use of that information." ' 0 The court found the Ohio statute,
more than the Florida, Georgia, and Texas statutes, attempted to
prevent arbitrariness in the determination of guilt and sentence
concluding that the constitutional concerns expressed in Furman
have been met by the Ohio statute.
Responding to Bayless' assertion that the mitigating circumstances set forth in the Ohio Revised Code are unconstitutionally
limited in number and scope, the court stated:
The General Assembly might properly have included other mitigating circumstances, or declined to list specific mitigating circumstances, but we conclude that those which are listed do direct inquiry both
to the circumstances of the crime and to the individual culpability
of the defendant, and so adequately guide the decision of the sentencing authority.'
In the opinion of the court, the designation of the degree of punishment to be fixed for a particular offense, and the determination of
what circumstances should preclude the imposition of the death
penalty is a legislative rather than judicial responsibility.
Through testimony and evidence presented at the presentence
hearing, the defense counsel argued that the defendant's emotional
88. 428 U.S. 153.
89. 428 U.S. 242.
90. 48 Ohio St. 2d at 8, 357 N.E.2d at 1044. The Ohio statute, in attempting to eradicate
the possibility of jury arbitrariness in sentence determination, removed the decision from the
jury altogether. That this was not the intent of the Furman decision, has been indicated in
the Gregg opinion, that "[j]ury sentencing has been considered desirable in capital cases in
order to maintain a link between contemporary community values and the penal system a link without which the determination of punishment could hardly reflect the evolving
standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society." 428 U.S. at 190 (citations
omitted).
91. 48 Ohio St. 2d at 86, 357 N.E.2d at 1045 (citations omitted).
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and behavioral abnormalities constituted mental deficiency within
the third statutory mitigating circumstance in Ohio Revised Code
section 2929.04(B)(3). The trial judge defined the term as being
equivalent to mental retardation or low intelligence, and thus found
that no mental deficiency existed. The defendant felt that the very
narrow definition of mental deficiency adopted by the trial judge
should be broadened to include behavioral and emotional abnormalities. The court responded to this argument by agreeing that the
standards set by the statute should be "strictly construed in favor
of the defendant, to allow the broadest consideration of mitigating
circumstances consistent with their language,"" but should not be
construed in derogation of the ordinary and accepted meaning of the
term. Since the term "mental deficiency" is not defined in Ohio
statutes, the court held that the ordinary and accepted meaning of
the term must be adopted. The court cited definitions of mental
deficiency from several dictionaries9 3 and from testimony of psychiatric witnesses at the mitigation hearing, concluding that the term
is basically synonymous with mental retardation and does not include the emotional and behavioral abnormalities claimed by Bayless. 4 Finally, the court stated that the decision whether certain
mental states, not constituting insanity, justify mitigation of a sentence and preclude the imposition of the death penalty is a proper
5
question for the Ohio General Assembly to resolve. The Ohio Supreme Court, therefore, upheld the constitutionality of the Ohio
capital punishment statute.
Approximately one month following the Bayless decision, the
Ohio Supreme Court heard State v. Black.9" Black had been convicted of two counts of aggravated murder and was sentenced to
death. 7 The appellant's major assertion was that the failure of the
statute to define the terms "mental deficiency" and "psychosis" as
used in Ohio Revised Code section 2929.04(B)(3) rendered the statute unconstitutionally vague and ambiguous because the sentencing
92. Id. (emphasis added).
93. Id. at 95, 357 N.E.2d at 1050.
94. Id. at 96, 357 N.E.2d at 1051.
95. Id. at 87, 357 N.E.2d at 1046. This assertion coincides with the opinion of the United
States Supreme Court as expressed in Gregg that the statutory specification of punishment
for an offense is a legislative rather than judicial function. See 428 U.S. at 176.
96. 48 Ohio St. 2d 262, 358 N.E.2d 551 (1976).
97. Of the five assertions made by the petitioner, only the fifth assertion need be
discussed. The first assertion, the question of the constitutionality of the Ohio capital punishment statute, was decided in Bayless. The second, third, and fourth propositions of law are
not relevant to this comment.
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judge has no standards upon which to base his decision.
Although the court in Bayless had concluded that the term
mental deficiency meant a "low or defective state of intelligence, "8
it interpreted mental deficiency less restrictively in Black. Responding to the allegation that the terms mental deficiency and psychosis
are vague and ambiguous, the court stated that leaving the terms
undefined is advantageous to the defendant, because no limitations
are therefore put on the examination of the mental state of the
offender. The court said: "Thus, broadly defined and however evidenced, any mental state or incapacity may be considered in light
of all the circumstances and including the nature of the crime itself
so that it may be determined whether the condition found to have
existed was the primary producing cause of the offense." 9 This was
a wide departure from the court's refusal in Bayless to weigh emotional and behavioral abnormalities. 10 Despite this new latitude,
the court upheld the lower court's decision concluding that the verdict was consistent with the evidence. 10'
The same day that the Black decision was rendered, the Ohio
Supreme Court handed down its decision in State v. Bell.'"' Bell, a
minor at the time of the crime, was sentenced to death as an accomplice to the shot-gun death of a robbery victim.
The appellant contended that a minor is "mentally deficient"
per se within the meaning of Ohio Revised Code section
2929.04(B)(3). In response, the court reiterated its position taken in
Bayless that the term mental deficiency must be given its common, everyday meaning. That meaning, "a low or defective state
of intelligence" ' 03 does not include minority per se. The rationale
the court gave for its interpretation was that the Ohio General
Assembly could have very easily and clearly established age as a
mitigating factor if it had so intended.'"4 The court, therefore,
rejected the proposition.
Further, the appellant asserted that even if a minor is not men98. 48 Ohio St. 2d at 96, 357 N.E.2d at 1050.
99. 48 Ohio St. 2d at 268, 358 N.E.2d at 556.
100. According to this broader definition, the behavioral and emotional abnormalities
that Mr. Bayless alleged to exist could have been weighed in the consideration of mitigation
of the death penalty. It would appear that any mental state or incapacity would include
emotional considerations.
101. 48 Ohio St. 2d at 269, 358 N.E.2d at 556.
102. 48 Ohio St. 2d 270, 358 N.E.2d 556 (1976), cert. granted, 97 S. Ct. 2971 (1977) (No.
76-6513).
103. 48 Ohio St. 2d at 96, 357 N.E.2d at 1050.
104. 48 Ohio St. 2d at 280, 358 N.E.2d at 563-64.
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tally deficient per se, the circumstances of the particular case and
the history, character, and condition of the offender established
that the offense was the result of his mental deficiency. At the time
the offense was committed, the defendant was 16 years old, had an
I.Q. between 81-90, had been under the daily influence of drugs for
three years, and was emotionally immature for his age. He had been
placed in a special school for abnormal students unable to mentally
or emotionally cope with normal educational processes. He also
stated that he over-identified with the actual killer and was ex°5
ploited by others with more habitual criminal attitudes.' The appellant alleged that the combination of these circumstances established by a preponderance of the evidence that the offense was a
result of his mental deficiency. He felt that these unique circumstances could not be taken into consideration under the existing
statutory mitigating circumstances, therefore no consideration was
given to the relevant aspects of the character and record of the
0
defendant as required by Woodson.'°
The Ohio Supreme Court dismissed Bell's allegations and affirmed his sentence. In its opinion, the court stated:
It has been alleged that the mitigating circumstances under R.C.
2929.04(B) are unconstitutionally narrow because a number of very
important factors, such as age and criminal record of the defendant,
appear to be irrelevant under the statute. We believe, however, that
the Ohio statutory scheme can withstand this attack. The Ohio statutes, properly construed, permit the trial judge or panel to consider
107
these factors at the mitigation hearing.
The court also stated that it considered age, minority as well as
senility, to be primary considerations in determining the existence
of a mental deficiency. It concluded, however, that the sum of the
evidence and testimony did not support the appellant's contention
a mental deficiency which was the primary
that he suffered from
08
offense.1
his
of
cause
Five days following Bell and Black, the Ohio Supreme Court
decided State v. Harris.0 Harris asserted that the trial court was
in error in finding that the crime was not primarily the product of
105. Brief for Petitioner at A-12, State v. Bell, 48 Ohio St. 2d 270, 358 N.E.2d 556
(1976), cert. granted, 97 S. Ct. 2971 (1977)(No. 76-6513).
106. 428 U.S. at 304.
107. 48 Ohio St. 2d at 281, 358 N.E.2d at 564.
108. Id. at 282, 358 N.E.2d at 565.
109. 48 Ohio St. 2d at 351, 359 N.E.2d 67 (1976).
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his mental deficiency. The appellant was considered a sociopath,1 0
according to several physicians who testified at trial; had a borderline or low I.Q.; and, maintained that he was under the influence
of drugs the night the offense was committed."'
The Ohio Supreme Court held that no evidence of mental deficiency or psychosis at the time of the offense was established, and
therefore affirmed the decision. Two interesting exclusions under
the term mental deficiency were made: 1) that "sociopath" is not
equated with mental deficiency; and, 2) that "borderline or low I.Q.
levels of intelligence are above that of mental deficiency." ' Thus,
the Ohio Supreme Court further narrowed its operational definition
of mental deficiency.
In State v. Lockett,"3 the appellant proposed, as Harris had
done, that the death penalty should not have been imposed because
the offense was the result of a mental deficiency. She was found
guilty of being an accomplice to an armed robbery in which a death
resulted. The appellant was on the borderline of mental retardation,
subject to undue influence of others, and under the influence of
methadone. Again the court ruled that a mental deficiency did not
exist and upheld her sentence.
The Ohio Supreme Court has heard other cases which have
alleged that the mitigating circumstances under Ohio Revised Code
section 2929.04(B) are unconstitutionally narrow." 4 In its decisions
the court reiterated its holding in Bell and in Bayless that the mitigating circumstances of Ohio Revised Code section 2929.04(B) are
not to be construed narrowly, and that all relevant factors are to be
considered by the sentencing authority. However, it appears that
the Ohio Supreme Court has not followed its own rulings. As the
110. Sociopath was defined by a psychiatrist in testimony before the court as being an
antisocial personality disorder listed under the category: Personality Disorders and Certain
Non-Psychotic Mental Disorders in the American Psychiatric Associations Diagnostic
and
Statistical Codes. It includes lack of feeling, absence of a functioning conscience and lack
of
inhibitive personality traits exhibited by the average person. See 48 Ohio St. 2d at 362,
359
N.E.2d at 73.
111. Id. at 363, 359 N.E.2d at 74.
112. Id.
113. 49 Ohio St. 2d 48, 67-68, 358 N.E.2d 1062, 1075 (1976). Although the sentence was
upheld by the Ohio Supreme Court, this is the first Ohio case reviewed in this comment for
which a dissenting opinion was written. J. Stern dissented stating that the punishment
(imposition of the death penalty) was grossly out of proportion with the severity of the crime
and in violation of the eighth amendment to the constitution. Consideration of this factor
is
not allowable under the Ohio capital punishment statute.
114. See, e.g., State v. Lane, 49 Ohio St. 2d 77, 358 N.E.2d 1081 (1976); State v.
Osborne, 49 Ohio St. 2d 135, 359 N.E.2d 78 (1976).
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cases above indicate, the court has narrowly construed the statutory
provisions for the mitigation of capital punishment.
V.

ANALYSIS

The review of decisions rendered by the United States Supreme
Court evidenced several key elements which are highly significant
to the evaluation of the constitutionality of any capital punishment
statute. This section examines the Ohio statutory scheme in light
of these criteria. ' ' 6

The first element requisite to the constitutionality of a statute
is the provision of sufficient objective statutory guidelines to satisfy the concerns expressed in Furman that the death penalty not
be applied in an arbitrary or capricious manner. The United States
Supreme Court, in Gregg, stated that this concern can be met by
assuring that the sentencing authority has adequate information on
which to base a decision, and standards to guide the decisionmaking process. Although the standards may necessarily be of a
general nature, and some discretion may still exist, the likelihood
that discriminatory and arbitrary sentencing will result is greatly
reduced. The Court concluded that the establishment of a bifurcated proceeding can fulfill this requirement."'7 Since the Ohio
scheme provides for a two-step proceeding, it clearly complies with
constitutional requirements.
The second test of constitutionality is whether the statute provides for the consideration of all the particular circumstances of the
specific offense before the sentence is determined. The statutory
enumeration of aggravating circumstances, one of which must be
proven before the death penalty can be imposed, directs attention
to the specific nature of the offense."' The Ohio capital punishment
statute employs this procedure. In addition, the sentencing authority's attention is directed to the nature of the offense by the first two
statutory mitigating circumstances. They allow for the mitigation
of the death penalty if a preponderence of the evidence establishes
that the offense was induced or facilitated by the victim, or the
offense was committed under duress, coercion, or strong provoca115.
116.
117.
118.
stances .
crime."

See section II supra.
See section Ilm supra.
Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. at 195.
Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262, 271. "[Tlhe consideration of aggravating circum. . requires the sentencing authority to focus on the particularized nature of the
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tion. The combination of these provisions in the Ohio statute more
than adequately satisfies the second test of constitutionality.
The third element which must be present in any constitutional
capital punishment statute is the provision for expedited judicial
review. Several appellants have argued that this criterion has not
been met by the Ohio statute" 9 because the Ohio Supreme Court is
not required to review all cases. The constitutionality of the Ohio
judicial review procedure was established, however, when the Texas
system of judicial review was upheld by the United States Supreme
20
Court in Jurek v. Texas.1
The fourth constitutional test has most frequently been the
basis for the contention that the Ohio capital punishment statute
is unconstitutional. This test requires consideration of the past record and unique character of the individual offender before the sentence is determined. The United States Supreme Court established
the significance of this requirement when it cited the lack of particularized consideration of mitigating circumstances as its basis for
declaring the North Carolina and Louisiana statutes unconstitutional.
The question whether sufficient consideration is given to the
character and record of the individual offender has centered around
the quality and quantity of information that can be weighed in
determining the existence of one of the three mitigating circumstances. The concern is based on the Supreme Court's decision in Jurek
which stated that in order to focus on the particularized circumstances of the individual offender, "consideration of particularized mitigating factors" is required. 2 ' In Ohio only one statutory mitigating
factor directs attention to the character and history of the offender.
That is, that the offense is the result of the psychosis or mental
deficiency of the offender.
The Ohio Supreme Court has held that the statutory mitigating
circumstances set forth in the Ohio Code adequately satisfy the
Jurek requirement. The court pointed to the language of the statute
itself to express this opinion in Bell:
The Ohio statutes, properly construed, permit the trial judge or panel
to consider these factors at the mitigation hearing .... [It] is evident
119. See, e.g., State v. Osborne, 49 Ohio St. 2d at 147, 359 N.E.2d at 87. The Ohio
Supreme Court responded by stating that the United States Supreme Court has "never stated
that the constitutionality of a state death penalty scheme hinges on whether it provides for
direct review by the state supreme court." Id.
120. 428 U.S. at 276.
121. Id. at 271-72.
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as R.C. 2929.04(B) states that the death penalty...

is precluded

when, considering the nature and circumstances of the offense and
the history, character and condition of "the offender," one or more
of the mitigating circumstances is established. 2"
Ohio appellants have strongly disagreed with the opinion of the
Ohio Supreme Court in this matter."3 The court stated that allowance is made for "consideration of the broad range of information
relevant to mitigation' '1 24 by this statutory construction. The question of the quantity of mitigating circumstances that can be considered therefore hinges upon the interpretation of what information is relevant to determining the presence or absence of mental

deficiency. 125
The court has repeatedly held that the provisions of the statute
must be broadly construed in favor of the defendant. It has stated
that any mental state or incapacity may be considered in determining whether a mental deficiency exists. The interpretation and application of the term mental deficiency by the court, however, has
limited mental deficiency to the very narrow category of mental
retardation or low intelligence. 16
The Ohio Supreme Court acknowledged in Bayless that the
number of mitigating circumstances which may be considered has
been limited by statute. 1 7 In its opinion, the court stated that the
question of what circumstances may mitigate against the imposition
of the death penalty is a decision for the Ohio legislature. The legislative history of the statute, however, indicates that the original
intent of the General Assembly was to include other circumstances
relevant to the character and record of the offender in mitigation of
sentence. The statute, based on the Model Penal Code, originally
included all the mitigating circumstances enumerated therein. Prior
to the adoption of the statute, the Furman decision was handed
down by the United States Supreme Court; and solely to satisfy the

122. 48 Ohio St. 2d at 281, 358 N.E.2d at 564.
123. See section IV supra.
124. 49 Ohio St. 2d at 147, 359 N.E.2d at 86.
125. The definition of psychosis has not been a controversial subject, or an issue before
the court. It therefore need not be dealt with in this discussion.
126. See State v. Royster, 48 Ohio St. 2d 381, 389, 358 N.E.2d 616, 622 (1976). The court
denied the existence of a mental deficiency even in light of his I.Q. scores [100 = average]
of 75 (1962), 61 (1966) and 54 (1968). I.Q. scores are the most objective method available for
the measurement of the functioning level of intelligence of an individual.
127. 48 Ohio St. 2d at 86, 357 N.E.2d at 1046. When it stated that "the General
Assembly might properly have included other mitigating circumstances" in the statute.
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prohibition against unbridled discretion and sentencing discrimination set forth in Furman, the legislature deleted all but three mitigating circumstances from the final draft of the statute. The legislature indicated that this action was intended to eliminate as much
discretion from the sentencing processes as possible.'28
In its five post-Furman decisions, the United States Supreme
Court has stated that mitigating circumstances need not be susceptible to mechanical application in order to satisfy the concerns addressed by Furman.'9 The Court further stated that a certain
amount of discretion is inherent in any sentencing system that
treats every offender and offense as uniquely individual.
In ruling on the constitutionality of the death penalty per se,
the Court has indicated that prevailing standards of decency are
significant in determining the excessiveness of a punishment. 30 The
Ohio capital punishment statute deviates significantly from other
states in relation to the number of circumstances which mitigate the
death penalty. In Alabama, Arkansas, Florida, and Nebraska, a
broad range of mental and emotional disturbances may be considered as a mitigating factor.' 3 ' Limitations in the capacity of the
defendant to regulate or appreciate the wrongfulness of his conduct
are mitigating in Alabama, Arizona, Arkansas, Connecticut, Florida, Nebraska, and in Federal jurisdictions, and preclude imposition of the death sentence in Colorado.' 31 In Alabama, Arkansas,
Colorado, Connecticut, Florida, Nebraska, Utah, and Federal jurisdictions, the age of the defendant must be taken into consideration;
and in Colorado, Connecticut and under Federal law, the minority
of a defendant is an absolute bar to the imposition of the death
penalty.'3 3 Twelve jurisdictions require the prior criminal record of
the defendant to also be considered. The statutes of Florida, Georgia, and Texas as interpreted by the United States Supreme Court,
put no limitation at all on the number or scope of circumstances
128. Lehman and Norris, Some Legislative History and Comments on Ohio's New
Criminal Code, 23 CLEv. ST. L. Rav. 8 (1974). A good summary of the legislative history of
the present Ohio capital punishment statute may be found on pages 8-31.
129. Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242, 260 (1976) (White, J., concurring).
130. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. at 173.
131. Ala. H.B. 212 § 7(b); ARK. CODE § 41-4712(a); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 921.141(7)(b);
NEB. REv. STAT. §§ 92-2523(2)(b) & (c).
132. Ala. H.B. 212 § 7(f); ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 13-454(F)(1); ARK. CODE § 41-4712(c); Col.
S.B. No.46; CONN. GEN. STAT. § 53a-45(f)(2); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 921.141(7)(f); NE. REV. STAT.
§ 29-2523(2)(g); 49 U.S.C. § 1473(c)(6)(B).
133. Note, CapitalPunishment Statutes After Furman, 35 OHIO ST. L.J. 651 (1974). For
a good summary of the capital punishment statutes enacted by the various states after the
Furman decision, see 651-685.

https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol3/iss1/9

COMMENT

19781

considered to be relevant to sentence determination. Arizona, Illinois, Montana, and Utah will consider any factor deemed relevant
to mitigation by the sentencing authority.'34
The wide range of mitigating circumstances considered in other
jurisdictions indicates a general trend of public opinion. The prevailing standard apparent in these jurisdictions has not been followed by Ohio although the legislative history of the Ohio statute
35
indicates the original desire of the Ohio legislature to do so.'
Whether the Ohio scheme, as interpreted by the Ohio Supreme
Court, allows sufficient consideration of the character and history
of the offender, therefore, is unclear.
VI.

CONCLUSION

In determining the constitutionality of the Ohio capital punishment statute, it must be evaluated in relation to the statutes on
which the United States Supreme Court has already ruled. The
difference between the Florida, Georgia, and Texas statutes which
were ruled constitutional, and the Louisiana and North Carolina
statutes which were held unconstitutional lies in the quantity of
mitigating circumstances which may be considered by a sentencing
authority. The statutes upheld allow consideration of any circumstances in mitigation while the statutes struck down allow consideration of none. The Ohio statute falls between these two extremes on
the continuum.
The United States Supreme Court has granted certiorari in
State v. Bell,'36 and the case will be heard during the current term
of the Court. The number of mitigating circumstances considered
in the Ohio capital sentencing procedure will no doubt be addressed. The Ohio statute appears to fall closer on the continuum to the
statutes the Court has already found unconstitutional, than to those
which have been upheld. The Court has never said that all circumstances must be considered in mitigation of a death sentence. The
Court has stated, however, that:
A jury must be allowed to consider on the basis of all relevant evidence ...

why a death sentence.., should not be imposed. Thus, in

order to meet the requirement of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments, a capital-sentencing system must allow the sentencing authority to consider mitigating circumstances. In Gregg v. Georgia, we
134.
135.
136.

See note 133 supra.
See note 125 supra.
48 Ohio St. 2d 270, 358 N.E.2d 556 (1976), cert. granted, 97 S. Ct. 2971 (1977).
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hold constitutionally valid a capital-sentencing system that directs
the jury to consider any mitigating factors, and in Proffitt v. Florida
we likewise hold constitutional a system that directs the judge and
advisory jury to consider certain enumerated mitigating circumstances. "
The constitutionality of a system which allows consideration of only
a very limited number of mitigating circumstances remains as yet
uncertain.
William H. Hart
137.

428 U.S. at 271-72.
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